

CONCEPTUALIZATION AND DELIMITATION OF THE CONCEPTS OF TURNOVER, STABILITY, VARIABILITY AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE LEGISLATURES

The article attempts to solve one of the problems of institutional Political Science, which is that modern research seldom appeals to the institution of parliament in the categories of its stability and efficiency, even though some scholars analyze different parameters of defining the institutional attributes of parliaments, including their variability and institutionalization. On this basis, the author put on the agenda of the study the issues of clarifying, filling in with the content and delimitation of some of the institutional attributes – stability, variability, dynamics and institutionalization – of parliaments. As a result, some tendencies in the definition and significance of parliamentary dynamics and parliamentary variability were singled out and confirmed at the background of their separation from the stability and institutionalization of legislatures. The researcher proved that parliamentary dynamics in democratic countries is determined by both internal and external factors, including electoral volatility, type of electoral systems, and type of party systems and etc. It is also shown that parliamentary variability directly depends on the institutional and political changes that take place in relation to the nature of electoral institutions – types of electoral systems, frequency of elections, ability to run on different electoral lists, size of constituencies.

Keywords: parliament, legislature, parliamentary dynamics, variability, stability, institutionalization.

Konceptualizacja i definicja pojęć obiegu, stabilności, zmiany i instytucjonalizacji ustawodawstwa

Artykuł jest próbą rozwiązania jednego z problemów politologii instytucjonalnej, który polega na tym, że współczesne badania odwołują się do instytucji parlamentu w kategoriach stabilności i efektywności, mimo że niektórzy naukowcy analizują różne parametry wyznaczania instytucjonalnych atrybutów parlamentów, w szczególności ich zmienność i instytucjonalizację. Na tej podstawie autor umieścił na agendzie badawczej właśnie problem doprecyzowania, wypełnienia treścią i wyodrębnienia niektórych atrybutów instytucjonalnych – stabilności, zmienności, obiegu i instytucjonalizacji parlamentów. W rezultacie zidentyfikowano i potwierdzono pewne tendencje w zakresie definicji i znaczenia obiegu parlamentarnego oraz zmienności parlamentarnej na tle jego oddzielenia od stabilności i instytucjonalizacji legislatury. Udowodniono, że rotację parlamentarną

w krajach demokratycznych determinują zarówno czynniki wewnątrzparlamentarne, jak i zewnętrzne, w szczególności zmienność elektoratu, rodzaj systemu wyborczego, rodzaj systemu partyjnego itp. Wykazano również, że zmienność parlamentarna bezpośrednio zależy od zmian instytucjonalnych i politycznych zachodzących w związku z charakterem instytucji wyborczych – rodzaje systemów wyborczych, częstotliwość wyborów, możliwość startowania na różnych listach wyborczych, wielkość okręgów wyborczych.

Słowa kluczowe: parlament, ustawodawca, obieg parlamentarny, zmienność, stabilność, instytucjonalizacja.

КОНЦЕПТУАЛІЗАЦІЯ І РОЗМЕЖУВАННЯ ПОНЯТЬ ОБІГУ, СТАБІЛЬНОСТІ, МІНЛИВОСТІ Й ІНСТИТУЦІОНАЛІЗАЦІЇ ЛЕГІСЛАТУР

У статті здійснено спробу розв'язати одну з проблем інституційної політології, яка полягає у тому, що сучасні дослідження зрідка апелюють до інституту парламенту в категоріях стабільності й ефективності, навіть попри те, що деякі науковці аналізують різні параметри окреслення інституційної атрибутики парламентів, зокрема їхньої мінливості й інституціоналізації. На цій підставі автор поставив на порядок денний дослідження саме проблематику з'ясування, наповнення змістом і розмежування деяких інституційних атрибутів – стабільності, мінливості, обігу й інституціоналізації, – парламентів. У підсумку було виокремлено і підтверджено деякі тенденції означення та значення парламентського обігу й парламентської мінливості на тлі її відокремлення від стабільності й інституціоналізації легіслатур. Доведено, що парламентський обіг у демократичних країнах визначається як внутрішньопарламентськими, так і зовнішніми чинниками, зокрема електоральною мінливістю, типом виборчих систем, типом партійних систем тощо. Також показано, що парламентська мінливість прямо залежить від інституційних та політичних змін, які відбуваються у прив'язці до характеру виборчих інститутів – типів виборчих систем, частоти виборів, здатності балотуватись за різними виборчими списками, розміру виборчих округів.

Ключові слова: парламент, легіслатура, парламентський обіг, мінливість, стабільність, інституціоналізація.

In modern institutional political science, the subject of interest and optional research of political institutions is becoming more and more diverse, as a result of which, for example, a number of scholars are often interested in stability, efficiency, variability, strength of various formal and informal political institutions, etc. On the one hand, it is the subject of a huge number

of scientific works of researchers from all countries and regions of the world, thanks to which the institution of parliament is studied and compared primarily for its multi-factorial (party, personal, committee, management, etc.) structuring and ordering. On the other hand, the institution of parliament is seldom considered in terms of stability and efficiency, even though some researchers still appeal to different parameters for defining the institutional attributes of parliaments, including their variability, dynamics, institutionalization, etc. Accordingly, it puts on the agenda the issue of clarifying, filling in the content and delimitation of some institutional attributes – stability, variability, dynamics and institutionalization – of parliament.

In trying to solve this scientific problem, we appeal to a fairly large array of scientific works authored by such, especially Western European and American, scientists as K. Anderson and S. Thorson¹, H. Best and M. Cotta², J. Gibbing³, J. Graham⁴, R. Darcy and J. Choike⁵, D. Judge⁶, K. Jackson⁷, K. Eliassen⁸, T. Castevens and W. Denham⁹, R. Matland and D. Studlar¹⁰, D. Matthews¹¹, P. Norris¹², R. Putnam¹³, W. Petzelt¹⁴, M. Petrakka¹⁵, N. Polsby¹⁶, J. Swain, S. Borrelli and B. Reed¹⁷, R. Sisson¹⁸, P. Squire¹⁹, A. Somit²⁰, M. Fiorina, D. Rode and P. Wessel²¹, J. Fund²²,

¹ Anderson K., Thorson S., Congressional Turnover and the Election of Women, *Western Political Quarterly* 1984, vol 37, s. 143-156.

² Best H., Cotta M., *Parliamentary Representatives in Europe, 1848-2000: Legislative Recruitment and Careers in Eleven European Countries*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.

³ Hibbing J., Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them?, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1999, vol 24, s. 149-171.; Hibbing J., Legislative Institutionalization with Illustrations from the British House of Commons, *American Journal of Political Science* 1988, vol 32, s. 681-712.

⁴ Graham J., Legislative Careers in the French Chamber and U.S. House 1871-1940, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1982, vol 7, s. 37-56

⁵ Darcy R., Choike J., A Formal Analysis of Legislative Turnover: Women Candidates and Legislative Representation, *American Journal of Political Science* 1986, vol 30, s. 237-255.

⁶ Judge D., Legislative Institutionalization: A Bent Analytical Arrow?, *Government and Opposition* 2003, vol 38, s. 498-516.

⁷ Jackson K., *Stability and Renewal: Incumbency and Parliamentary Composition*, [w:] Somit A., Wildenmann R., Bell B., Rommel A. (eds), *The Victorious Incumbent: A Threat to Democracy?*, Wyd. Dartmouth 1994, s. 251-277.

⁸ Eliassen K., Pedersen M., Professionalization of Legislatures: Long-Term Changes in Political Recruitment in Denmark and Norway, *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 1978, vol 20, s. 123-132.

⁹ Casstevens T., Denham W., Turnover and Tenure in the Canadian House of Commons: 1867-1968, *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 1970, vol 3, s. 655-661.

¹⁰ Matland R., Studlar D., Determinants of Legislative Turnover: A Cross-National Analysis, *British Political Science Journal* 2004, vol 34, s. 87-108.

¹¹ Matthews D., *Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers*, [w:] Loewenberg G., Patterson S., Jewell M (eds.), *Handbook of Legislative Research*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 1985, s. 17-56.

¹² Norris P., Lovenduski J., *Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1995.

¹³ Putnam R., *The Comparative Studies of Political Elites*, Wyd. Prentice-Hall 1976.

¹⁴ Patzelt W., Recruitment and Retention in Western European Parliaments, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1999, vol 24, s. 239-279.

¹⁵ Petracca M., *Rotation in Office: The History of an Idea*, [w:] Benjamin G., Malbin M. (eds.), *Limiting Legislative Terms*, Wyd. CQ Press 1992, s. 19-52.

¹⁶ Polsby N., The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives, *American Political Science Review* 1968, vol 62, s. 144-168.

¹⁷ Swain J., Borrelli S., Reed B., Evans S., A New Look at Turnover in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1789-1998, *American Politics Quarterly* 2000, vol 28, s. 435-457.

¹⁸ Sisson R., *Comparative Institutionalization: A Theoretical Explanation*, [w:] Kornberg A. (ed.), *Legislatures in Comparative Perspective*, Wyd. David McKay Company 1973.

¹⁹ Squire P., Career Opportunities and Membership Stability in Legislatures, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1988, vol 13, s. 65-82.

²⁰ Somit A., Wildenmann R., Rommel A., *The Victorious Incumbent: A Threat to Democracy?*, Wyd. Dartmouth 1994.

²¹ Fiorina M., Rohde D., Wessel P., *Historical Change in House Turnover*, [w:] Ornstein N. (ed.), *Congress in Change*, Wyd. Praeger 1975, s. 24-57.

²² Fund J., *Term Limitations: An Idea Whose Time Has Come*, [w:] Benjamin G., Malbin M. (ed.), *Limiting Legislative Terms*, Wyd. CQ Press 1992, s. 225-240.

A. Khayama²³ and many others, in which these issues are considered mostly on the example of different developed Western states.

However, despite the rather wide range of works and ideas of these scholars, they still do not provide a holistic mechanism for conceptualizing and delimiting the concepts of dynamics, stability, variability and institutionalization of parliaments, a gap which, at least in part, we will continue to fill by our research.

From the works of the above mentioned scholars we can conclude that it is extremely rare in political science, but different attributive symbols of the institution of parliament, such as dynamics, stability, variability and institutionalization, are still used but they are denoted as both different or related, and distinctive, but complementary clarifying developments and phenomena. This is manifested, for example, in the fact that in Western political science there is no single consolidated and holistic categorical definition and designation of the temporal and forceful / authoritative context of the parliament functioning institution, in particular its stability, variability or strength, since to name them separately or in different ways there are used such concepts as “parliamentary variability”, “parliamentary stability”, “parliamentary fluidity”, “parliamentary dynamics”, “parliamentary change”, “institutionalization of parliament”, etc., and variability, stability or force of parliaments are coded on the basis of accurate or at least approximate indicators of reshuffling / both the removal of deputies, parties and committees, and the functions and role of the parliamentary institution in different time periods, but first of all in different parliamentary convocations.

We believe that in order for these or at least some of these categories to be well understood and distinguished, they need to be outlined, detailed and filled with certain content.

Thus, the category of “parliamentary turnover” or “turnover of the legislature” should be rationally used, given that in the case of the institution of parliament as a cyclically operating and functioning institution, it is necessarily a question of personnel replacements and reshuffles within successive legislatures, as well as with reference to the fact that the description of personnel changes, especially in economics, is described using the term “staff turnover”. However, along with this definition, the term “parliamentary variability” should be considered in a somewhat narrower sense, in particular as a process of functioning of parliament and the process of institutional and contextual changes in the legislature at each stage of its development, i.e. in each successive convocation. In this sense, the comparative analysis of change and representation of deputies of national parliaments is a rather fundamental topic in Western comparative political science, especially given that such change and parliamentary dynamics in general are characterized differently by various political systems in the world changes) among deputies of national parliaments.

Hypothetically and conceptually, we note that the possibility and expediency of making changes and changes in parliamentary or legislative staff (i.e. among deputies of successive

²³ Hayama A., Incumbency Advantage in Japanese Elections, *Electoral Studies* 1992, vol 11, s. 46-57.

legislatures) are important from the point of view of the theory of the elites' dynamics²⁴, especially in order to create a structure of career motives and reserves for promising political leaders²⁵ and to accelerate changes in public policy²⁶. After all, without the dynamics of elites, there would be far less new ideas, and therefore legality / legitimacy and legislation would suffer. Therefore, it is in this regard that K. Jackson notes that the insufficient volume / level of parliamentary dynamics or changes among members of the legislature inevitably cause the danger of such three socio-individual phenomena as arrogance, apathy and atrophy²⁷. After all, when the rapid dynamics of elites is inherent in periods of political and socio-economic crises, a moderate dynamics of deputies is needed, according to R. Putnam, also in periods of relative socio-political calm and balance, in particular to maintain social and political stability²⁸ addressed to the dissatisfied groups.

With this in mind, the category of "parliamentary dynamics" begins its scientific history as an integral part of the theories of the dynamics of elites²⁹, in particular as a framework between the two boundaries of the paradox. At the same time, its lowest limit implies that insignificant parliamentary turnover is equal to or inherent in autocratic and limited political leadership, a situation that will sooner or later lead to a lack of legitimacy of power. On the other hand, the upper limit is also destructive, as it affects the quality of parliamentary work and endangers the process of developing tactics in the legislature. That is why parliamentary leadership can cut costs (including information) and create (or at least try) new models of cooperation. And this at a time when the constant influx of new people / MPs in parliaments will be associated with low party discipline and clientelistic problems of novice MPs in front of their constituencies, etc³⁰. This is even more evident in the context of representation, one of the most important normative criteria for evaluating legislatures, on the basis of which accountability, representation and accountability can be indicators of comparison of dynamics in parliaments³¹.

Other explanations that appeal to parliamentary dynamics in the context of the dynamics of modern elites or elites in representative democracies include compilations of the following nature: ideas about the benefits of the theory of "dynamics of government administrations" by M. Petrakka³², the thesis about the "elimination of fraudsters" by S. Rothenberg³³. Moreover,

²⁴ Putnam R., *The Comparative Studies of Political Elites*, Wyd. Prentice-Hall 1976

²⁵ Norris P., Lovenduski J., *Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1995; Schlesinger J., *Ambition and politics: Political careers in the United States*, Wyd. Rand McNally 1966.

²⁶ Brady D., *Critical Elections and Congressional Policymaking*, Wyd. Stanford University Press 1991.; Bunce M., *Do Leaders Make a Difference? Executive Succession and Public Policy under Capitalism and Socialism*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 1981

²⁷ Jackson K., *Stability and Renewal: Incumbency and Parliamentary Composition*, [w:] Somit A., Wildenmann R., Bell B., Rommel A. (eds), *The Victorious Incumbent: A Threat to Democracy?*, Wyd. Dartmouth 1994, s. 270.

²⁸ Putnam R., *The Comparative Studies of Political Elites*, Wyd. Prentice-Hall 1976, s. 65-68.

²⁹ Putnam R. *The Comparative Study of Political Elites*. – Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1976. – 246p. (P.68).

³⁰ Schepsle K., *The giant jigsaw puzzle: Democratic committee assignments in the modern House*, Wyd. Chicago University Press 1978.

³¹ Rieselbach L., *Congressional Reform: The changing modern Congress*, Wyd. CQ Press 1994.

³² Petrakka M., *Rotation in Office: The History of an Idea*, [w:] Benjamin G., Malbin M. (eds.), *Limiting Legislative Terms*, Wyd. CQ Press 1992, s. 19-52

³³ Rothenberg S., How Term Limits Became a National Phenomenon, "State Legislatures" 1992, vol 18, s. 35-39.

K. Chi and D. Lizerbay emphasize that changing the powers of deputies of national legislatures promotes democracy or democratization, guaranteeing alternative elections, as it leads to “more open mandates”³⁴. D. Fund claims that the term of office of the legislature members increases the quality of legislation, because they reduce the importance of the phenomenon of seigniorage, as the legislator, who remains in office for 1-20 years, becomes more influential³⁵. After all, the term of office of legislators, according to J. Weil, is a complement to any proposal to improve the efficiency and capacity of the political system³⁶. Accordingly, in this regard, it is obvious that parliamentary dynamics, parliamentary turnover or turnover of the legislature is an important component of the democratic idea in the first place. In addition, the modern theory of democratic sovereignty defines any government (in a broad sense these are power or governance) as a projection of the desires and will of the people, because they exercise direct and indirect control of the system, which is their “creation”.

This means that the ability to “remove” their elected representatives, who are unable to adhere to the will of the national character, is important for people, because it helps them determine the parameters and framework of the effectiveness of reproduction / reproduction of the political system. After all, when this ability is limited (reduced), there is a weakening of the ability of the government to be an instrument of influence of individuals.

In addition, it should be noted that the modern theory of liberal and representative democracy considers parliamentary variability or parliamentary dynamics primarily as an effective way to prevent tyranny³⁷. After all, the task of democracy is to protect the possibility of government and to ensure the rights of the majority and the minority. However, representative democracy assigns a rather limited role to the public, which distinguishes it from the theory of democratic sovereignty. However, even so, the ability of citizens to remove the current leadership from power is important in order to avoid the dangers of tyranny and autocracy. The threat of a change of leadership is an effective obstacle to tempting some parliamentarians to use their powers for their own benefit. The fact is that when the share of reshuffles of parliamentarians and officials decreases, there may be a “temptation” to pursue politics primarily in their own interests and the interests of their political environment, rather than to increase public goods, which shows other dysfunctional results of the political process. In contrast, according to the proponents of the theory of representative democracy, valuable in terms of representation is the legislature, which embodies the representation of citizens of different socio-economic strata and groups³⁸. After all, when groups excluded

³⁴ Chi K., Leatherby D., State Legislative Term Limits, “*Solutions: Policy Options For State Decision-Makers*” 1998, vol 6, s. 1-39.

³⁵ Fund J., *Term Limitations: An Idea Whose Time Has Come*, [w:] Benjamin G., Malbin M. (ed.), *Limiting Legislative Terms*, Wyd. CQ Press 1992, s. 235-236.

³⁶ Vile J., *Rewriting the United States Constitution: An Examination of Proposals from Reconstruction to the Present*, Wyd. Praeger 1991, s. 160-161.

³⁷ Katz R., *Democracy and Elections*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1997.

³⁸ Phillips A., *The Politics of Presence*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1995.; Pitkin H., *The Concept of Representation*, Wyd. University of California Press 1972.

from the struggle demand fair political representation, low parliamentary turnover can be a burden that prevents the state from moving towards a more representative, in particular at the expense of women, leadership and government format³⁹.

In addition, it should be noted that parliamentary dynamics or parliamentary variability also affects public policy. As different types of individuals, socially, economically and ideologically, try to gain positions in power – in legislatures, etc. – their strategic political prerogatives differ significantly. Therefore, any innovations in terms of the staff of parliaments can determine the common position of parliaments as public authorities. Various scholars⁴⁰ have argued, for example, that increasing women's representation in government in general and in legislatures in particular is changing strategic priorities in many countries.

Thus, it was found that the change of staff in parliaments, even though the party's control over the legislatures may not change, can lead to dramatic changes in the strategic political principles of the existing legislatures⁴¹. As a result, the perception of the fact that the low turnover of parliamentarians and government officials in general is or may be a problem that motivates the public to initiate a movement to establish a compulsory term for government officials is theorized. Especially considering that deputies become a priori at least partially distant from the public from the moment they receive their positions in the legislature⁴². Accordingly, low movement or turnover in parliaments is a reason for isolating the law from the public, as electoral ties and influence are not enough to prevent abuse of office by certain parliamentarians. However, at the same time as much of the theory and practice of democracy in real political systems focuses on the need to guarantee sufficient change of government, it is clear that too much parliamentary dynamics should also be considered problematic for theories of democracy and democratic sovereignty. The fact is that theory and practice indicate the "centricity" nature of citizens' representatives in their legislative activity. Therefore, if there are too many reshuffles among members of parliament, any legislature with open public relations may find itself in an awkward situation with regard to the government and the head of state, etc.

In this context, it is important that one of the defining mechanisms of parliamentary dynamics is political parties in representative democracies, especially those with mechanisms of parliamentary influence on the formation and / or accountability of governments, i.e. the so-called parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. The fact is that changes in the parliamentary majority in the legislature and the perturbation of parties in governments ensure the

³⁹ Anderson K., Thorson S., Congressional Turnover and the Election of Women, *Western Political Quarterly* 1984, vol 37, s. 143-156.; Darcy R., Choike J., A Formal Analysis of Legislative Turnover: Women Candidates and Legislative Representation, *American Journal of Political Science* 1986, vol 30, s. 237-255.

⁴⁰ Bratton K., Ray L., Descriptive Representation, Policy Outcomes, and Municipal Day-Care Coverage in Norway, *American Journal of Political Science* 2002, vol 46, s. 428-437.; Rosenthal C., *When Women Lead: Integrative Leadership in State Legislatures*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1998.; Thomas S., *How Women Legislate*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1994.

⁴¹ Wolbrecht C., *The Politics of Women's Rights: Parties, Positions, and Change*, Wyd. Princeton University Press 2000

⁴² Hibbing J., Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them?, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1999, vol 24, s. 149-171.

dynamics of elites create opportunities for the influence of opposition groups and ultimately lead to changes in state policy. Thus, as J. Gibbing points out⁴³, it is the parties, not parliaments in general, that are the main promoters of the stabilization and institutionalization of legislatures. However, the analysis of parliamentary dynamics from the point of view of parties bypasses the subject of controversy about quantitative changes in the composition and staff of parliamentary parties, and regardless of changes in the composition of parliaments and governments. Therefore, this means that the consequences and indicators of parliamentary variability are regulated both at the non-partisan (individual among deputies) and at the party level, i.e. through intra-party dynamics in legislatures⁴⁴, although this is quite different in various countries with diverse types of electoral and party systems in general.

In particular, as noted in a number of comparative political studies, parties are not as influential in this regard in presidential democracies (as, for example, in the United States), as in parliamentary democracies (particularly in almost all European countries). The fact is that in the first group of cases, individual parliamentarians and officials can strengthen their positions in the performance of their duties by serving the constituencies, and above all by directly ensuring the interests of the groups and individuals to whom they are electorally attached⁴⁵. One of the reasons is that in these cases the advantages of various public positions and the consistent reduction of their dynamics, including in parliaments, have been historically documented⁴⁶. Instead, in the second group of cases, both the processes inherent in the previous group (in the format of serving constituencies of individual deputies⁴⁷) and the processes determined by greater structuring of party systems are important, as the format of interparty relations often determines parliamentary dynamics and the behavior of deputies of legislatures. This means that parliamentary dynamics is regulated both personally and electorally, and collectively and party-wise, in particular by various indicators of the significant number of competing parties and the relative strength of parties, the role of competition for appointments within parties, type of electoral systems, peculiarities of distribution of powers between representatives of different parties, career opportunities within the legislature and other authorities, legislative professionalism, etc⁴⁸. It clearly follows from all this that parliamentary dynamics is regulated by both internal parliamentary factors and external (institutional, electoral, party, etc.)

⁴³ Hibbing J., Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them?, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1999, vol 24, s. 149-171.

⁴⁴ Brady D., *Critical Elections and Congressional Policymaking*, Wyd. Stanford University Press 1991.

⁴⁵ Cain B., Ferejohn J., Fiorina M., *The Personal Vote*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 1987.

⁴⁶ Fiorina M., Rohde D., Wessel P., *Historical Change in House Turnover*, [w:] Ornstein N. (ed.), *Congress in Change*, Wyd. Praeger 1975, s. 24-57.; Polsby N., The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives, *American Political Science Review* 1968, vol 62, s. 144-168.; Swain J., Borrelli S., Reed B., Evans S., A New Look at Turnover in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1789-1998, *American Politics Quarterly* 2000, vol 28, s. 435-457.

⁴⁷ Lancaster T., Patterson D., Comparative Pork Barrel Politics: Perceptions from the West German Bundestag, *Comparative Political Studies* 1990, vol 22, s. 458-477.; Norton P., Wood D., *Back from Westminster: British members of Parliament and their constituents*, Wyd. University of Kentucky Press 1993.

⁴⁸ Matthews D., *Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers*, [w:] Loewenberg G., Patterson S., Jewell M (eds.), *Handbook of Legislative Research*, Wyd. Harvard University Press 1985, s. 17-56.; Squire P., Career Opportunities and Membership Stability in Legislatures, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1988, vol 13, s. 65-82.

factors⁴⁹. That is why in Western political science it has become commonplace to use two sets of data and factors solving the problem of parliamentary dynamics. The first factor involves the analysis of parliamentary dynamics based on the results of identifying parties and political leaders as politically responsible for their stay in power. Instead, the second factor outlines the restructuring of election legislation and the linking of parliamentarians and candidates to their constituencies (if it is possible).

This sometimes raises the issue of the so-called “normal” or democratic parliamentary dynamics and the orderly dynamics of political elites, which are sometimes even seen as one of the dimensions of the institutionalization of parliaments ((which will be discussed in more detail below). In this regard, one of the theorists of parliamentary dynamics N. Polsby believes that the long career of a deputy and, conversely, low rates of parliamentary dynamics are decisive factors in the institutionalization of legislatures. Therefore, stable and high indicators of stability of officials or low indicators of their variability in legislatures are needed in order to create a field of legislative knowledge that allows deputies to standardize their activities and make decisions in a predictable way⁵⁰. In addition, the continuity of the careers of parliamentarians is important because the architecture of internal differentiation in legislatures is based on arguments about tenure, the most important of which is the so-called “seniority” or “seigniorage”. Accordingly, proponents of this theoretical approach view low parliamentary turnover as a sign of high institutionalization of parliaments, even in consolidated democracies⁵¹. In contrast, another theorist of parliamentary dynamics, J. Gibbing, takes a different view, arguing or trying to predict that the institutionalization of parliaments is compatible with high rates of change or reshuffling⁵². The scholar emphasizes that the institutionalization of parliaments should not reduce the absolute indicators of parliamentary turnover, but can minimize them, so new deputies should be quickly hired and socialized in their new roles to successfully and in a short time to replace deputies who lost seats. And this certainly negates the tradition of research, which suggests that positions are an indicator of strong institutionalization of parliaments, ie the previous approach. At the same time, A. Somit makes a synthetic conclusion that there is no single systemic feature that consistently correlates with high or low parliamentary turnover, because each state is unique, and data on political, electoral and party practices and processes can be very different⁵³. However, even so, it can be generalized that the parliamentary turnover or turnover of legislatures, ie the aggregate level of “exits from parliament”, can correlate continuously from the previous parliamentary elections to the next ones, from the election of

⁴⁹ Hall R., Van Houweling R., Avarice and Ambition in Congress: Representatives' Decisions to Run or Retire from the U.S. House, *"American Political Science Review"* 1995, vol 89, s. 121-136.; Polsby N., The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives, *"American Political Science Review"* 1968, vol 62, s. 144-168.

⁵⁰ Polsby N., The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives, *"American Political Science Review"* 1968, vol 62, s. 148.

⁵¹ Blondel J., *Comparative Legislatures*, Wyd. Prentice Hall 1973.

⁵² Hibbing J., Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them?, *"Legislative Studies Quarterly"* 1999, vol 24, s. 149-171.

⁵³ Somit A., Wildenmann R., Rommel A., *The Victorious Incumbent: A Threat to Democracy?*, Wyd. Dartmouth 1994, s. 14.

candidates to the lower house of parliament in conditions of bicameralism to the election to a single house of parliament in a unicameral legislature.

In this sense, it is certainly important to state that parliamentary dynamics or parliamentary variability, if not, it can most likely be tangent to the signs and parameters of stability of party systems in certain states or entire regions, in particular in Western Europe or Central and Eastern Europe, etc. This is especially true given that party systems and organizations are not equally stable, and election results can be characterized by varying volatility⁵⁴. It is more important taking into account the fact that the stability of party systems is based on the fact of their verification with the focus on the relationship between political parties and blocs / coalitions⁵⁵. The fact is that the stability of party systems is the product of two factors: 1) parties as organizations that seek to promote their candidates to parliaments and cabinets in order to achieve specific political goals; 2) models of party interaction, in particular in the framework of their entry or non-membership in the governmental and opposition components / groups of inter-party competition⁵⁶. In other words, this means that the functioning of the party system is through the prism of at least two parameters: changes in the actual party organization within a party system and changes in the competition structure of party electoral blocs in a party system. Accordingly, a stable party system presupposes not only the existence of stable parties, but also the existence of stable patterns of their interaction. By this logic, the degree of stability of parties in the party system can be combined with indicators of electoral volatility / variability and changes in the party organization⁵⁷. All mentioned above mean that the central test in this context is to verify the theoretical and practical alignment of the stability of party systems with indicators of parliamentary dynamics or parliamentary variability, or in other words, the extent to which they are interconnected and interdependent. Moreover, the starting point of the analysis is the comparison of changes among the participants in the election process with an emphasis on parliamentary dynamics and indicators of electoral variability (as a possible consequence of stability or instability of party systems), the basis of which is the modern theory of the dynamics of elites.

Theoretically and partially empirically, political science has developed an understanding that the correlation between electoral variability and parliamentary dynamics or parliamentary variability in successive parliaments confirms the expectations of elite dynamics theory based on party structure and stability and changes in party systems. The fact is that it is clearly stated that higher party stability and lower electoral variability mean or hypothetically cause

⁵⁴ Innes A., Party Competition in Postcommunist Europe: The Great Electoral Lottery, *Comparative Politics* 2002, vol 35, s. 85-104.; Kischelt H., Mansfeldova Z., Markowski R., Toká G., *Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation and Inter-Party Cooperation*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1999.; Mair P., *Party system change. Approaches and interpretations*, Wyd. Clarendon Press 1997.

⁵⁵ Sartori G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1976.; Smith G., What is a Party System?, *Parliamentary Affairs* 1966, vol 19, nr. 3, s. 351-362.

⁵⁶ Mair P., *Party system change. Approaches and interpretations*, Wyd. Clarendon Press 1997.; Smith G., A Systems Perspective on Party System Change, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1989, vol 1, s. 349-363.

⁵⁷ Bartolini S., Mair P., *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilization of European Electorates: 1885-1985*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.

a decrease in parliamentary variability. In other words, it has been established that the decline in parliamentary dynamics corresponds to the trend of stabilization of party systems.

Empirically, this is interesting given the assumption of scholars that the optimal indicator of parliamentary turnover is a 30 percent component of parliamentary rotation among the staff of two consecutive legislatures⁵⁸.

At the same time, the analysis of the stability of party systems in the context of parliamentary variability in the above format is only one side of the coin. Instead, the other side is the logic of taking into account the stability of party systems by determining the number of party parliamentary groups (factions), which are defined by consistent and stable representation in successive legislatures (in the categories of party entrances and exits to the legislature, both as a result of elections and as a result of other political processes in already elected parliaments) on the basis of their relationship with parliamentary turnover indicators. Such a mechanism of correlation or interrelation of parliamentary variability / parliamentary dynamics and stability of party systems is often considered as the basis for calculating the influence of the former on the institutionalization of legislatures as a separate attribute of this political institution. In addition, this mechanism is an option to test one of the political science hypotheses, in particular, that the institutionalization of the legislature is compatible with high rates of parliamentary turnover or rotation among the deputies of two successive legislatures⁵⁹. After all, the institutionalization of parliaments, according to this hypothesis, should not reduce the absolute rate of parliamentary variability, but can still minimize them⁶⁰. Although, in contrast and as mentioned above, this hypothesis challenges the tradition of parliamentary research, which suggests that positions are an indicator of strong institutionalization of legislatures⁶¹.

The theoretical relevance of verifying the correlation of parliamentary variability and institutionalization of legislatures is due to several factors: a) a small number of scholars deal with the problem of the impact of parliamentary dynamics on the institutionalization of legislatures in a comparative perspective⁶²; b) there are virtually no empirical attempts to identify highly institutionalized parliaments that demonstrate low stability / turnover among members of the legislature; c) interest in verifying that if the institutionalization of parliaments could be inherent even in conditions of high parliamentary variability, the professionalization of deputies, the system of parliamentary committees, internal parliamentary norms and procedures will then need additional attention.

⁵⁸ Best H., Cotta M., *Parliamentary Representatives in Europe, 1848-2000: Legislative Recruitment and Careers in Eleven European Countries*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000.; Crowther W., Matonyte I., Parliamentary elites as a democratic thermometer: Estonia, Lithuania and Moldova compared, *East European Politics and Societies* 2007, vol 40, s. 281-299.; Narud H., Pedersen M., Valen H., *Party Sovereignty and Citizen Control Selecting Candidates for Parliamentary Elections in Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway*, Wyd. University Press of Southern Denmark 2002.

⁵⁹ Hibbing J., Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them?, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1999, vol 24, s. 149-171.

⁶⁰ Hibbing J., Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them?, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1999, vol 24, s. 149-171.

⁶¹ Polsby N., The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives, *American Political Science Review* 1968, vol 62, s. 144-168.

⁶² Matland R., Studlar D., Determinants of Legislative Turnover: A Cross-National Analysis, *British Political Science Journal* 2004, vol 34, s. 87-108.; Somit A., Wildenmann R., Rommel A., *The Victorious Incumbent: A Threat to Democracy?*, Wyd. Dartmouth 1994.

But in this context, the problem of determining parliamentary dynamics or parliamentary variability, as discussed above, is manifested, in particular, as changes between new members of the same parliament (in the same state) between (as a result of) its two consecutive elections. The fact is that in this case there is inaccuracy, because it is not clear how to take into account a member of parliament who returns to the legislature after one or more election cycles when he was not a member of parliament. On the one hand, he is a new MP, and on the other – not at all MP⁶³.

It is to overcome this shortcoming in political science that parliamentary variability can be analyzed and compared not only in person (in deputies) but also collectively (in parties and party groups). At the same time, the main indicator of personalized measurement of turnover among deputies and parliamentary variability in general, mainly in the context of institutionalization of legislatures, is the percentage of deputies, former members of parliament, who are considered re-elected. Of additional importance may be the preservation of the roles of the so-called “core group” of parliamentarians, which includes committee leaders, heads of parliaments, i.e. speakers and deputy speakers, i.e. the so-called “parliamentary elite” in general. Combining personalized and collective (party-group) logic of understanding and assessing parliamentary variability is important in the context of the phenomenon of institutionalization of parliament.

However, the problem is that there is no unity of researchers on how to understand or appropriate the institutionalization of legislatures, in particular in the sense that it belongs to the list of its attributes. Thus, N. Polsby⁶⁴ believes that the signs of institutionalization of parliaments are their “limitations”, “internal complexity” and the attribute of “automatic decision-making.” Moreover, the limited number of legislatures mainly refers to the fact of “division”, i.e. obtaining the autonomy of parliaments from external factors, and therefore in this case it is primarily about indicators of stability of members of parliament, their professionalism and stability of leadership roles⁶⁵. In turn, the internal complexity of legislatures is defined by the theory of specialization, in particular as a result of increasing the autonomy of parliaments, and hence the importance of committees and resources and the influence of individual members of parliament⁶⁶. Finally, automatic decision-making by legislatures stems from the application of universal principles of organization and hierarchy, including the development of seigniorage in committees and the “settlement of choices when competing for merit⁶⁷.”

In contrast, other researchers understand the institutionalization of parliaments as institutionalized autonomy and organizational complexity of legislatures⁶⁸ or internal organization-

⁶³ Hibbing J., Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them?, *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1999, vol 24, s. 149-171.

⁶⁴ Polsby N., The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives, *American Political Science Review* 1968, vol 62, s. 144-168.

⁶⁵ Judge D., Legislative Institutionalization: A Bent Analytical Arrow?, *Government and Opposition* 2003, vol 38, s. 503.

⁶⁶ Polsby N., The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives, *American Political Science Review* 1968, vol 62, s. 153.

⁶⁷ Judge D., Legislative Institutionalization: A Bent Analytical Arrow?, *Government and Opposition* 2003, vol 38, s. 503.

⁶⁸ Sisson R., *Comparative Institutionalization: A Theoretical Explanation*, [w:] Kornberg A. (ed.), *Legislatures in Comparative Perspective*, Wyd. David McKay Company 1973, s. 18.

al development and external differentiation of legislatures⁶⁹. Other scholars point out that the institutionalization of parliaments is evidenced by the leadership (formal internal structures and organization) of legislatures and their ability to reproduce and resist social interference⁷⁰. It follows that, speaking of the institutionalization of parliaments, check such indicators of this phenomenon as: level or degree of institutionalization of committees (their structure (permanent or changing), composition and autonomy, including the right of legislative initiative, the right of legislative amendments, the right to professional advice)⁷¹; indicator of stability of parliamentary factions and groups in parliaments; indicator of parliamentary turnover (percentage of deputies returning to previous parliamentary positions, strengthening the personal structure of parliaments).

It is in this context that it has been established that parliamentary dynamics has a different structure, because of what it can be defined in differently and it affects the institutionalization, strength and stability of legislatures in quite different ways. In particular, it was found that parliamentary dynamics or parliamentary variability is composed of two structural components, such as unintentional withdrawal and voluntary withdrawal of deputies or party groups / factions from the legislature. In this context, the term “withdrawal” in this context is typically understood as the termination of a deputy in parliament, and the concept is associated with the theory of systems.

Unintentional withdrawal of a deputy from the parliament may take place when: a candidate who was given a deputy mandate in the previous convocation of the legislature is defeated by the results of the counting of votes on the basis of ballots as a result of new elections; when a candidate for deputy cannot be re-appointed or nominated by his party; when a candidate is forced to resign due to a scandal; when it is caused by the death or illness of a deputy at the time of his or her performance of official duties or a candidate for deputy during the election campaign. Interestingly, the scandal can lead to the resignation of only some, but not all members of parliament, and therefore it does not affect a very significant percentage of total parliamentary variability. This is even more the case in the event of death or illness as a deputy or candidate, as they are unlikely to be a determining factor in parliamentary dynamics in terms of aggregate parliamentary dynamics.

In addition, the limited number of deaths among MPs in the line of duty indicates that they are not a significant factor. Statistically, some researches say⁷² that on average, less than one percent of MPs die in the line of duty. In contrast, two other cases of unintentional termination of deputies' powers as factors of parliamentary variability are more relevant and significant. It

⁶⁹ Judge D., *Legislative Institutionalization: A Bent Analytical Arrow?*, “*Government and Opposition*”.

⁷⁰ 70Kopecky P., *Parliaments in the Czech and Slovak Republics: Party Competition and Parliamentary Institutionalization*, Wyd. Ashgate 2001, s. 14.

⁷¹ Olson D., Crowther W., *Committees in Post-Communist Democratic Parliaments: Comparative Institutionalization*, Wyd. Ohio State University Press 2002, s. 33.

⁷² Jackson K., *Stability and Renewal: Incumbency and Parliamentary Composition*, [w:] Somit A., Wildenmann R., Bell B., Rommel A. (eds), *The Victorious Incumbent: A Threat to Democracy?*, Wyd. Dartmouth 1994, s. 251-277.; Swain J., Borrelli S., Reed B., Evans S., *A New Look at Turnover in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1789-1998*, “*American Politics Quarterly*” 2000, vol 28, s. 435-457.

should be noted that the most common form of unintentional withdrawal of deputies from parliament is their defeat in the parliamentary elections. The probability of defeat must be explained by several basic factors, including the structural features of the electoral systems of certain states. One of the most obvious factors regarding parliamentary dynamics is an indicator and the fact of how often an official can be re-elected. After all, there are significant differences in how often parliamentary elections are held, including depending on the term of office of deputies, and the ability of no-confidence votes and other factors to cause the dissolution of parliament and its early elections. In view of this, scholars often note that increasing the frequency of the deputies' re-election increases the frequentness and probability of losing their parliamentary powers, primarily due to defeat before candidates from other parties or groups, etc., especially in electorally changing party systems. After all, in this context, significant are remarks of political theorists that in the event of an increase in electoral volatility, MPs' feelings about the possible loss of their seats in the new parliamentary elections significantly increase⁷³. The same is true when the electorate, for various reasons, is characterized by volatility, as it is also theoretically and intuitively the basis for increasing parliamentary dynamics, albeit to varying degrees within different types of electoral systems for electing legislatures⁷⁴. Finally, this is influenced by certain mechanical effects of different types of electoral systems, in particular in their connection to the types of party systems in certain countries, but primarily due to the proportionality of the election results⁷⁵.

It is for this reason that political science argues that parliamentary variability increases with the size of constituencies and the proportionality of electoral systems, although it may be the reason for a candidate's defeat due to the influence or desire of his own party. At the same time, it is interesting that the rates of internal party defeats of candidates are also higher in proportional or more proportional electoral systems. However, in contrast, proportional systems that use closed lists provide candidates with the greatest degree of protection against intra-party reshuffles, since voters are unable to change the order because it is established by the parties themselves. Instead, proportional systems with open or preferential voting correlate depending on the assessment of candidates for the possibility of their intra-party reshuffle. Some electoral systems have very high electoral barriers, so voters are virtually unable to make changes to the ballot paper submitted by parties, the second electoral system simply sets relatively high electoral barriers, the third one ensures that voters determine which of the candidates will be elected to parliament, etc. However, it is absolutely clear that electoral systems that tend to lose seats

⁷³ Bartolini S., Mair P., *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilization of European Electorates: 1885-1985*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1990.; Crewe L., Denver D., *Electoral Change in Western Democracies: Patterns and Sources of Electoral Volatility*, Wyd. Croom Helm 1985.; Pedersen V., The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility, "European Journal of Political Research" 1979, vol 7, s. 1-26.

⁷⁴ Tufte E., The Relationship Between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems, "American Political Science Review" 1973, vol 67, s. 540-547.

⁷⁵ Gallagher M., Proportionality, disproportionality and electoral systems, "Electoral Studies" 1991, vol 10, s. 33-51.; Taagepera R., Reformulating the Cube Law for Proportional Representation Elections, "American Political Science Review" 1986, vol 80, s. 489-504.

and are threatened with intra-party reshuffle lead to higher parliamentary turnover or higher parliamentary variability, and thus do not contribute to the institutionalization of legislatures.

It is also noteworthy that in addition to electoral reshuffle – the main form of unintentional withdrawal of a deputy from parliament – the latter may also be caused by the cancellation of the election. However, the abolition of the election is different from the intra-party electoral change, as it describes a situation where a certain deputy cannot be re-appointed by the party to this position. This is a relatively rare phenomenon, as normally officials wishing to be re-elected are re-appointed without any problems. However, one reason why revoking elections is considered rare may be the fact that officials who run the risk of being eliminated may opt for voluntary resignation instead. At the same time, the abolition of the election by the party leadership is especially characteristic of systems where there is no mechanism through which intra-party change can be described. It is also important that the probability of canceling the election depends on the type of electoral system, as different electoral systems stimulate parties differently. However, one way or another, the candidates of parties in which there are formal levers of selection can be eliminated in the first place. To clarify the situation, it should be noted that the parties have at least two main incentives through which the process of considering the elimination of officials, including deputies before or during the election. First, parties must also have some internal dynamics so that they can encourage their candidates at lower levels of the party hierarchy / organization and force them to continue working for the party. Second, the party must understand whether the retention of an official improves the party's chances of retaining its seats in parliament as a whole. An official's ability to improve the party's capabilities depends on the extent to which he can attract votes based on electoral popularity. This assumption is based on the patronage of party representatives in a particular constituency, as well as on the visibility of the work of members of parliament on the ground and their ability to pursue government priorities. In general, this means that the more acceptable the size of the deputies' contribution, the more reluctant the parties will be to eliminate officials from their membership. After all, perhaps the last reason why a party can rotate its candidates and eliminate officials is that party ideology places special emphasis on the need to ensure that its deputies do not become distant from the people they represent.

In contrast, the decision to leave parliament voluntarily is the point when a deputy weighs the benefits and costs / losses in the process of his re-election against the benefits and costs / losses of other options for continuing his political career or ending his political career. One of the variables in the decision to resign a member of parliament is the impact of pension benefits. In this regard, scholars have shown that the decision to resign individual parliamentarians in most democracies is due to changes in the rules on pensions⁷⁶; after all, some deputies postpone their consent to voluntary resignation in order to take advantage of a more attractive financial benefit and prospect. In general, the political science literature on parliamentary

⁷⁶ Hall R., Van Houweling R., *Avarice and Ambition in Congress: Representatives' Decisions to Run or Retire from the U.S. House*, "American Political Science Review" 1995, vol 89, s. 121-136.

dynamics assesses the possibility of more attractive political positions outside the legislature rather sparingly. However, the focus of the research is on the progressive ambitions of deputies, among which the most important is the source of voluntary withdrawal from parliament. Some deputies suspend their activities in order to obtain higher political privileges. Other deputies are resigning to hold positions in other bodies and institutions of power, which is often more prestigious⁷⁷. However, it should be equally emphasized that parliamentary dynamics, under the influence of progressive aspirations and ambitions of individuals, is largely atypical for representative democracies. For example, in most European countries, the parliament is considered the pinnacle of political power: so, apart from it, there are actually few opportunities for a vertical movement of a deputy in terms of political career. After all, another body in which significant political powers are concentrated and on which deputies focus is the government / cabinet. However, in many cases (especially in parliamentary republics and parliamentary monarchies), ministers retain their seats in parliament or at least their seats on party lists in the next elections, provided they do not retain their positions in parliament. Therefore, in fact, the ministers know that they will be able to return to their previous (deputy) position and leave voluntarily again.

In general, taking into account the costs / losses and benefits of holding office, the degree to which parliamentary activity is attractive will depend on the amount and capacity of the individual MP and the quality of work within parliament. These variables directly depend on the level of institutionalization of legislatures. In this context, the research position is that since working conditions in parliaments today are more or less orderly, and strategic influence is significant, the service in the legislature is becoming more attractive, leading to a gradual reduction in parliamentary dynamics⁷⁸, and thus (as one of the factors) to the institutionalization of legislatures.

In general, on this basis, the study identified and confirmed some trends in the definition and importance of parliamentary dynamics / parliamentary variability in the context of its separation from the stability and institutionalization of legislatures, even though they are not always consolidated and inherent in all representative democracies. In particular, it was found that in democratic states (consolidated and semi-consolidated democracies) parliamentary dynamics is determined by both internal and external factors, including electoral variability, type of electoral systems, type of party systems, etc., after all, for example, the growth of electoral volatility leads to an increase in parliamentary dynamics among members of parliament. It is also reasoned that parliamentary variability directly depends on institutional and political changes related to the nature of electoral institutions – types of electoral systems, frequency of elections, ability to run on different voter lists, size of constituencies. Therefore, parliamentary dynamics may depend on electoral and political engineering. Finally, it has been established that parliamentary turnover or parliamentary variability increases in the event of an increased threat of intra-party electoral defeats of deputies and candidates, a decrease in the professionalization of legislatures and the institutionalization of parliamentary committees and parliaments in general.

⁷⁷ Schlesinger J., *Ambition and politics: Political careers in the United States*, Wyd. Rand McNally 1966.

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